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Notes
Status Quo Ante Remedies Under the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute
An important achievement of the Carter Administration was the
enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA).1 Title VII
of the CSRA, headed "Federal Service Labor-Management Relations"
(Statute),2 governs collective bargaining in the federal sector. For
more than two million federal employees,3 the Statute "establishe[d]
for the first time a statutory framework for the relationship between
employee representatives and Government managers with the opportu-
nity for third-party resolution of disputes between the parties."4
Before the Statute, labor relations in the federal sector were gov-
erned by Executive Order No. 11,491 (Executive Order), 5 as amended.6
The major organizational change effected by the Statute was the crea-
tion of an independent agency called the Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority (Authority).- The Authority performs essentially the same
functions that are performed by the National Labor Relations Board in
the private sector, and has the power to "conduct hearings and resolve
1. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1192 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982).
3. In 1979, the year the CSRA became effective, there were 2,419,047 full-time civilian
federal employees. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL CIVILIAN
WORKFORCE STATISTICS: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY STATISTICS at xiii (Nov.
1979).
4. SUBCOMM. ON POSTAL PERSONNEL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TRANSMITrAL LETTER: LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE,
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978 at vii (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
5. 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Comp.).
6. The first attempt at articulating the respective rights and obligations of federal em-
ployees, employee organizations, and agency management came in 1962 when President
Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10,988. On October 29, 1969, President Nixon issued
Executive Order No. 11,491, which became effective on January 1, 1970, the same day that
Executive Order No. 10,988 was revoked. Executive Order No. 11,491 remained the law
governing federal sector labor relations until January 1, 1979, the effective date of the
CSRA. President Nixon amended the Order twice, by Executive Order No. 11,616, issued
on August 26, 1971, and Executive Order No. 11,636, issued on December 17, 1971. The
Order was amended a third time by Executive Order No. 11,838, issued on February 6, 1975,
by President Ford. See H. ROBINSON, NEGOTIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR 1-3 (1981).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982).
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complaints of unfair labor practices."' 8 The functions now performed
by the Authority were performed under the Executive Order by the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations and the
Federal Labor Relations Council (Council).9
The Authority differs from its predecessor, the Council, in three
important respects. First, its members, appointed by the President, are
not permitted to hold another office or position in the federal govern-
ment.' 0 Second, the Statute provides for a General Counsel of the Au-
thority to investigate and prosecute complaints of unfair labor
practices." Third, the Authority is vested with the power to seek en-
forcement of its orders in the United States Courts of Appeals. 12 More-
over, the Authority is not bound by any precedent established by the
Council. 13
The Authority's duty to resolve complaints of unfair labor prac-
tices includes a duty to grant appropriate relief upon determining that
an unfair labor practice has been committed. Section 7118(a)(7) of the
Statute requires the Authority to impose certain enumerated remedies
or take "such other action as will carry out the purpose of this chap-
ter."'14 This Note focuses on the Authority's use of status quo ante rem-
8. Id. § 7105(a)(2)(G).
9. Section 6(a)(4) of Executive Order No. 11,491 provided for the resolution of unfair
labor practice complaints by the Assistant Secretary. The Federal Labor Relations Council
was established by § 4(a) and consisted of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,
the Secretary of Labor, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Section
4(c)(1) empowered the Council to hear appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary.
See 3 C.F.R. 861, 864-65 (1966-1970 Comp.).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a)-(b) (1982).
11. Id. § 7104(). No such position existed within the Council or the Department of
Labor under the Executive Order.
12. Id. § 7123(b).
13. The legislative history makes this clear. In a discussion of the management rights
provisions of the Statute, Representative William Ford of Michigan, one of the drafters of
the legislation, stated:
Accepting the House's clear intention that [Council] decisions interpreting the Ex-
ecutive order's management rights provisions were to be ignored, even where the
order's language is identical to that in title VII, was an essential threshold to reso-
lution of the differences on this title and the entire bill. (This allowed the conferees
to adopt language without the interpretive gloss added by the Council.) We were
able to agree on inclusion of sometimes identical language because we fully in-
tended that the new Authority will start its interpretation of that language with a
clean slate.
124 CONG. Rac. 38,715 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 993.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 7118 (a)(7) (1982). See also 5 C.F.R. § 2423.29(b) (1983). The general
power under subsection 7118(a)(7)(D) is comparable to that vested in the National Labor
Relations Board under § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976). However, "remedies for employer violations under title VII. . .will not be
limited by the caseload development under the National Labor Relations Act governing
private employers." 124 CONG. REc. 38,714 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGiSLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 993.
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edies for violations of section 7116(a)(5), the provision making it an
unfair labor practice for a government agency "to refuse to consult or
negotiate in good faith with a labor organization" as required by the
Statute.'5
A status quo ante remedy takes the form of an order requiring a
return to the situation that existed before the commission of the unfair
labor practice. 16 In the case of a refusal to bargain, the order rescinds
changes in working conditions that were implemented unilaterally by
management. The purpose of the order is to insure that meaningful
bargaining occurs.17 A mere prospective bargaining order often proves
to be an inadequate remedy, as management has a vested interest in the
change it has already implemented. Genuine bargaining under such
circumstances is unlikely.'8 The status quo ante remedy takes on added
importance in the federal sector, where the scope of bargaining is al-
ready severely curtailed. 19
After a brief discussion of the cases involving status quo ante reme-
dies decided by the Assistant Secretary and the Council under the Ex-
ecutive Order,20 this Note discusses the impact of the Statute on the
duty to bargain and the availability of status quo ante remedies.21 The
decisions of the Authority regarding the appropriateness of status quo
ante remedies are then examined.22 The Note concludes that the Au-
thority has failed to exercise its power to order a return to the status quo
15. 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (a)(5) (1982). This unfair labor practice is the same as the refusal
to bargain proscribed by § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976). Executive Order No. 11,491 contained a similar provision at § 19(a)(6).
See 3 C.F.R. 861, 873 (1966-1970 Comp.).
16. See generally D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES 207-10 (1976). With the exception of reinstatement with back pay, status quo
ante remedies are not among those remedies enumerated in § 7118(a)(7).
17. The Supreme Court approved a status quo ante remedy for this reason in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In that case, the employer
acted unilaterally in contracting out the maintenance work in its manufacturing plant with-
out negotiating with the exclusive bargaining representative of the company's maintenance
employees. Id at 206. After finding "contracting out" to be a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining, the NLRB ordered the company to resume its maintenance operations and
to reinstate the employees with back pay. Id at 215. Chief Justice Warren wrote for the
Court:
There has been no showing that the Board's order restoring the status quo ante to
insure meaningful bargaining is not well designed to promote the policies of the
Act. Nor is there evidence which would justify disturbing the Board's conclusion
that the order would not impose an undue or unfair burden on the Company.
Id. at 216.
18. See generally D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, supra note 16, at 8-15.
19. In contrast to the private sector, the scope of bargaining in the federal sector does
not include wages and benefits, which are matters provided for by statute. See infra note 42.
20. See infra notes 23-38 & accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 39-61 & accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 62-172 & accompanying text.
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ante to the extent envisioned by Congress when agency managers fail
to bargain in good faith. By disregarding congressional intent, the Au-
thority is encouraging the unilateral agency decisionmaking that the
Statute was designed to prevent.
Cases Decided by the Assistant Secretary and the Council
Under the Executive Order
Section 11 (a) of the Executive Order dealt with the obligation to
bargain "with respect to personnel policies and practices and matters
affecting working conditions. ' 23 This obligation was limited by section
1 (b), specifying subjects about which management was not required to
bargain,24 and section 12(b), specifying subjects that were completely
non-negotiable.25
Under the Executive Order cases, if a right existed to negotiate the
substance of a proposal under section 11 (a), a status quo ante remedy
generally would be appropriate if the agency refused to bargain.26
With mandatory bargaining subjects, the union had the right to negoti-
ate the agency's decision whether or not to act.2 7 Thus, a finding that
an agency's decision was unlawful generally required a return to the
status quo ante as the only adequate remedy.28 Such an award re-
23. 3 C.F.R. 861, 868 (1966-1970 Comp.).
24. Id. at 868-69.
25. Id. at 869-70. All of the rights retained by agency managers under § 12(b) were
carried forward into the Statute with one exception-the right "to maintain the efficiency of
the Government operations entrusted to them." This provision of the Executive Order often
acted as a bar to negotiations that now are proper under the Statute. See also infra notes 27,
31, 38.
26. See, e.g., United States Customs Serv., Region VI and National Treasury Employ-
ees Union and NTEU Chapter 143, A/SLMR No. 1161, 8 A/SLMR 1305 (Dec. 13, 1978);
Louisiana Army Nat'l Guard and NFFE Locals 1708 and 1737, A/SLMR No. 1117,. 8
A/SLMR 1019 (Sept. 6, 1978); IRS, Southwest Region and National Treasury Employees
Union and NTEU Chapter 91, A/SLMR No. 858, 7 A/SLMR 524 (June 28, 1977). For a
similar result in a case arising under the Statute, see United States Customs Serv., Region V
and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 168, 9 FLRA No. 15, 9
FLRA 116 (June 16, 1982) (discussed infra at note 28 and text accompanying notes 121-31).
27. Under 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1982),
[T]he duty to negotiate requires an agency to do more than merely consider what
the union might present; also, the agency may not act unilaterally. After the
agency has notified the union of a proposed change in conditions of employment,
the agency must, upon request, meet with the union at reasonable times and conve-
nient places, as frequently as is necessary, in an effort to reach a mutual, bilateral
agreement.
H. ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 39 (footnote omitted). The description of the section
7114(a)(4) duty to negotiate is identical to the obligation that existed under [§ 11 (a) oil Exec-
utive Order 11,491, as amended. Id. at 10 n.5.
28. See IRS, Southwest Region and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU
Chapter 91, A/SLMR No. 858, 7 A/SLMR 524 (June 28, 1977), in which the Assistant
Secretary stated:
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scinded the unilateral management action and in no way infringed on
management rights because section 11 (a) topics were fully negotiable.29
In contrast, management decisions not to negotiate on permissive
subjects under section 11 (b) of the Order as well as decisions to act or
not to act on matters reserved under section 12(b) were absolutely non-
negotiable.30 While section 1 (b) did not preclude negotiation of the
procedures and arrangements to be used in connection with certain
management decisions, 31 the Assistant Secretary took the position that
a failure to negotiate procedures and arrangements did not require a
status quo ante remedy.3 2
[Wlhere, as here, there has been a unilateral change in terms and conditions of
employment in violation of Section 19(a)(1) and (6) involving a subject matter
within the purview of Section I I(a) of the Order, generally it will effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Order to require that the Respondent re-establish the
terms and conditions of employment in existence prior to the unilateral change and
maintain such terms and conditions during the period in which the parties are
engaged in bargaining with respect to the proposed change.
Id. at 525 n.l. The same rationale applies in cases arising under the Statute. In United
States Customs Service, Region V and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU
Chapter 168, 9 FLRA No. 15, 9 FLRA 116 (June 16, 1982), the Authority said:
Noting particularly that the Respondent failed to meet its duty under the Statute to
bargain with NTEU concerning the decision to change the starting and quitting
times of the first shift or tour of duty, the Authority finds that an order directing
reinstatement of the previously existing starting and quitting times of the first shift,
upon request of NTEU, and requiring the parties to negotiate concerning the start-
ing and quitting times thereof, is necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Statute.
Id. at 119 (emphasis in original).
29. No infringement on management rights is possible in this situation because man-
agement had no right to act unilaterally.
30. "The emphasis is on the reservation of management authority to decide and act on
these matters, and. . . no right accorded to the union under the [Executive] Order may be
permitted to interfere with that authority." Veterans Admin. Indep. Serv. Employees Union
and Veterans Admin. Research Hosp., FLRC No. 71A-31, 1 FLRC 227,230 (Nov. 22, 1972).
31. The last sentence of § I 1(b) provided that "this does not preclude the parties from
negotiating agreements providing appropriate arrangements for employees adversely af-
fected by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological change." In contrast,
under the Statute all management decisions are subject to the requirement of negotiating
procedures and arrangements. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2)-(3) (1982).
32. See IRS and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 49,
A/SLMR No. 909, 7 A/SLMR 844 (Sept. 23, 1977). The Assistant Secretary found that the
agency had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to provide the union an opportu-
nity to bargain about the impact and implementation of an agency decision to reinstitute
security restrictions in its Classification Section. Id at 844. The administrative law judge
would have rescinded the unilateral action, but the Assistant Secretary held this to be inap-
propriate when the decision was non-negotiable under § I 1(b) of the Order:
[W]here, as here, there has been an improper failure to meet and confer over the
impact and implementation of a management decision which is not within the am-
bit of Section 11 (a) of the Order, generally it will not effectuate the purposes and
policies of the Order to require a return to the status quo ante as part of the reme-
dial order.
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The Council's approach was illustrated in National Treasury Em-
ployees Union and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms .33 The
case involved the negotiability of a union proposal to stay disciplinary
suspensions of employees pending completion of the parties' negotiated
grievance and arbitration process. 34 The Council ruled the proposal
non-negotiable because it would so unreasonably delay the exercise of
management's reserved right to discipline employees as to negate the
right.35 The Council relied on two prior decisions 36 that it said made
clear that "management's authority under section 12(b)(2) includes the
right to act in the matters reserved under that section without unrea-
sonable delay."'37
The rationale of the Council cases regarding remedies can be sum-
marized as follows. Granting a status quo ante remedy for failure to
negotiate the impact and implementation 38 of a management decision
not within the scope of section 11 (a) would delay an agency's exercise
of its undisputed management rights. Undue delays would negate
these rights and therefore were not permitted. Accordingly, a status quo
ante remedy could not achieve the purposes and policies of the Execu-
tive Order.
The Impact of the Statute
Against this background, Congress enacted the Statute as title VII
of the CSRA. The purposes and policies of the Statute differ from
those of the Order in that the Statute, unlike the Order, explicitly en-
courages collective bargaining39 and is intended to ensure the use of
Id. at 845 n.2 (citing with approval IRS and National Treasury Employees Union and
NTEU Chapter 47, A/SLMR No. 841, 7 A/SLMR 418 (May 16, 1977)).
33. FLRC No. 77A-58, 6 FLRC 176 (Jan. 27, 1978).
34. Id at 177.
35. Id at 180.
36. Veterans Admin. Indep. Serv. Employees Union and Veterans Admin. Research
Hosp., FLRC No. 71A-31, I FLRC 227 (Nov. 22, 1972); Local 63, American Fed'n Gov't
Employees, AFL-CIO and Blaine Air Force Station, FLRC No. 74A-33, 3 FLRC 75 (Jan. 8,
1975).
37. National Treasury Employees Union and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms, 6 FLRC at 180.
38. See infra notes 44-45 & accompanying text. The impact and implementation provi-
sions of the Statute are similar to those found in § 11 (b) of the Executive Order.
39. The difference is evident in their respective statements of policy. The Preamble to
Executive Order 11,491 provides:
WHEREAS the public interest requires high standards of employee performance
and the continual development and implementation of modem and progressive
work practices to facilitate improved employee performance and efficiency; and
WHEREAS the well-being of employees and efficient administration of the Gov-
ernment are benefited by providing employees an opportunity to participate in the
formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the
conditions of their employment; and
[Vol. 35
status quo ante remedies in a broader range of cases.
The Duty to Bargain Under the Statute
The Statute articulates the scope of the duty to bargain in some
detail, 4° and provides that an agency has a duty to bargain over "any
condition of employment. '41 This duty is limited by the management
rights provisions, which specify those subjects about which the parties
WHEREAS the participation of employees should be improved through the main-
tenance of constructive and cooperative relationships between labor organizations
and management officials; and
WHEREAS subject to law and the paramount requirements of public service, ef-
fective labor-management relations within the Federal service require a clear state-
ment of the respective rights and obligations of labor organizations and agency
management:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and statutes of the United States, including sections 3301 and 7301 of title 5 of the
United States Codes, and as President of the United States, I hereby direct that the
following policies shall govern officers and agencies of the executive branch of the
Government in all dealings with Federal employees and organizations representing
such employees.
In contrast, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982) provides:
(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) experience in both private and public employment indicates that the statu-
tory protection of the right of employees to organize, bargain collectively, and par-
ticipate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect
them-
(A) safeguards the public interest,
(B) contributes to the effective conduct of public business, and
(C) facilitates and encourages the amicable settlements of disputes between
employees and their employers involving conditions of employment; and
(2) the public interest demands the highest standards of employee perform-
ance and the continued development and implementation of modern and progres-
sive work practices to facilitate and improve employee performance and the
efficient accomplishment of the operations of the Government. Therefore, labor
organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public inter-
est.
(b) It is the purpose of this chapter to prescribe certain rights and obligations
of the employees of the Federal Government and to establish procedures which are
designed to meet the special requirements and needs of the Government. The pro-
visions of this chapter should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the re-
quirement of an effective and efficient Government.
40. The Statute is far more detailed regarding the duty to bargain than is the National
Labor Relations Act for the private sector. Compare NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 7106, 7114(b) (1982). There is no counterpart to § 7106 in the
NLRA. The general command of NLRA § 8(d) to negotiate with respect to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" has been developed by case law into a
scheme designating subjects of bargaining as either mandatory, permissive, or illegal. See
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In the federal sector
scheme, these designations are incorporated into the Statute itself.
41. The obligation to bargain is stated in 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1982). Section
7114(b)(2) defines the subject matter of bargaining as "any condition of employment."
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cannot bargain and those subjects negotiable only at the election of
agency management.42 Substantive decisions not reserved to manag-
ment are fully negotiable.43
There is, however, an exception to the management rights excep-
tion. Even when a substantive decision is reserved to management,
subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of section 7106 require that management
negotiate the procedures to be used in implementing the decision and
the impact of the decision on bargaining unit employees.44 This is
known as impact and implementation bargaining. 45 For example, a de-
cision by agency management to lay off a number of employees would
be non-negotiable under section 7106(a)(2)(A). However, the agency
must negotiate with the employees' representative the procedures to be
42. Id. § 7106. The management rights section provides:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall affect the
authority of any management official of any agency-
(I) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and
internal security practices of the agency; and
(2) in accordance with applicable laws-
(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency, or to
suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against
such employees;
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out,
and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments
from-
(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
(ii) any other appropriate source; and
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission
during emergencies.
(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization
from negotiating-
(1) at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types, and grades of employ-
ees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of
duty, or on the technology, methods, and means of performing work;
(2) procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exer-
cising any authority under this section; or
(3) appropriate arrangement for employees adversely affected by the exercise
of any authority under this section by such management officials.
The area of mandatory bargaining is further limited by the definition of "conditions of em-
ployment" at § 7103(a)(14). The definition excludes wages and benefits, which are "matters
• . . specifically provided for by Federal Statute." See generali, H. ROBINSON, supra note 6,
at 11-38.
43. These are decisions that come within the duty to negotiate about "any condition of
employment" that do not fall within any of the limiting provisions.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2)-(3) (1982). The legislative history makes clear that "proce-
dures and arrangements are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining." 124 CONG. REC.
38,715 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 993.
See also H. ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 30-32.
45. The nearest private sector equivalent is the concept of effects bargaining, as devel-
oped by the case law. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966) (requiring
meaningful bargaining over the effects of a decision to close a plant).
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used in informing employees of the layoff and in selecting the employ-
ees to be laid off. When management acts on its decision without nego-
tiating impact and implementation, it violates section 7116(a)(5).46 It is
in this situation that the appropriateness of a status quo ante remedy is
unsettled.
Under both the Executive Order and the Statute, a status quo ante
remedy has been deemed appropriate in almost every case involving a
unilateral change in working conditions in which the union had the
right to negotiate the substance of management's decision.4 7 However,
in those cases arising under the Executive Order in which the right to
bargain was limited to impact and implementation, the Assistant Secre-
tary consistently rejected the unions' argument that only a status quo
ante remedy could effectuate the purpose of the Executive Order.4 8
The Statute's legislative history, on the other hand, indicates that Con-
gress intended that the status quo ante remedy be used in impact and
implementation cases.
Legislative History of the Statute
The Statute represents a compromise between those members of
Congress who wanted to provide greater flexibility for government
managers and those who insisted on greater safeguards for the rights of
employees and employee representatives.49 In general, the Senate took
the position that title VII should simply codify the approach that had
developed under the Executive Order.50 In contrast, the House worked
out a substitute amendment embodying a new approach to labor-man-
agement relations in the federal sector.-5 The Conference Committee
specifically rejected a provision of the Senate bill providing that negoti-
ation on procedures should not unreasonably delay the exercise of
management's reserved rights so as to negate those rights.5 2 Indeed,
"[t]he House conferees were able, after meetings even longer than nor-
46. See cases cited in notes 74, 83, 90, and 114.
47. See supra note 26.
48. See, e.g., IRS and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 49,
A/SLMR No. 909, 7 A/SLMR 844 (Sept. 23, 1977); IRS and National Treasury Employees
Union and NTEU Chapter 47, A/SLMR No. 841, 7 A/SLMR 418 (May 16, 1977). These
cases are respresentative of the Assistant Secretary's views, although occasionally he found a
status quo ante remedy to be appropriate "[u]nder the particular circumstances of [the]
case." See IRS and National Treasury Employees Union and Chapter 6 NTEU, A/SLMR
No. 995, 8 A/SLMR 243, 244 n.1 (Mar. 2, 1978).
49. "[Tihis new labor-management program with expanded rights for employees and
their representatives was an essential response to the expansion of management prerogatives
in other titles of the bill." 124 CONG. REc. 38,713 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 990.
50. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-114 (1978).
51. The "Udall Compromise" is discussed at 124 CONG. REC. 38,713 (statement of
Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 989-90.
52. Section 7218(b) of Senate bill 2640 had provided:
STATUS QUO ANTE REMEDIESNovember 1983]
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mal, to persuade the Senate that the new beginning for Federal labor
relations mandated by the House bill was necessary, justified and fully
appropriate. ' '53
The legislative history indicates the importance of impact and im-
plementation negotiations and the role of the status quo ante remedy
when agencies refuse to negotiate procedures. The remarks of one of
the Statute's authors, Congressman William Ford, 54 concerning the
management rights provisions are especially instructive:
[T]he entire structure of the management rights clause is markedly
different from that in the [Executive Order]. By the clear language of
the bill itself, any exercise of enumerated management rights is con-
ditioned upon the full negotiation of arrangements regarding adverse
effects and procedures. As is made clear by the absence of the phrase
"at the election of the agency," procedures and arrangements are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Only after this obliga-
tion has been completely fulfilled is an agency allowed to assert that
a retained management right bars negotiations over a particular pro-
posal. This approach was dictated both by the [Council's] history of
interpretive abuse of the order's management rights provisions and
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall preclude the parties from
negotiating-
(1) procedures which management will observe in exercising its authority to
decide or act in matters reserved under such subsection; or
(2) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact
of management's exercising its authority to decide or act in matters reserved under
such subsection, except that such negotiations shall not unreasonably delay the exer-
cise by management of its authority to decide or act, and such procedures and ar-
rangements shall be consistent with the provisions of any law or regulation
described in 7215(c) of this title, and shall not have the effect of negating the author-
ity reserved under subsection (a).
S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (emphasis added).
However, as the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference in the
Conference Report explained:
3. Senate section 7218(b) provides that negotiations on procedures governing the
exercise of authority reserved to management shall not unreasonably delay the ex-
ercise by management of its authority to act on such matters. Any negotiations on
procedures governing matters otherwise reserved to agency discretion by subsec-
tion (a) may not have the effect of actually negating the authority as reserved to the
agency by subsection (a). There are no comparable House provisions.
The conference report deletes these provisions. However, the conferees wish to
emphasize that negotiations on such procedures should not be conducted in a way that
prevents the agency from acting at all, or in such a way that prevents the exclusive
representative from negotiatingfuily on procedures ....
S. REP. No. 1272, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1978) (emphasis added).
53. 124 CONG. Rc. 38,713 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 4, at 990.
54. After Representative Ford introduced this legislation in the House, he served as a
manager of the bill for the Conference Committee. His statement was made the day after
President Carter signed the bill into law.
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by logic itself.55
Indeed, the managers of the Conference Committee stated that, in ne-
gotiating impact and implementation, "the parties may indirectly do
what the [management rights] section prohibits them from doing
directly."'56
Further distinguishing the Statute from the Order, Representative
Ford noted that "one of the agencies' lawful prerogatives is no longer
the right to declare a bargaining proposal non-negotiable because it is
barred by the management right to maintain efficiency. The confer-
ence committee, by removing one barrier to effective collective bargain-
ing, increases the likelihood that the Government's efficiency will be
enhanced." 57
Later in his statement, Mr. Ford discussed remedies:
Remedies, among others, which we fully expect will be applied as
when they will carry out the purpose of Title VII include, tailored to
the violation, status quo ante orders ... ; make whole orders... ;
and orders requiring, at the unions election, retroactive execution of
an agreement .... In addition, the conference report specifically
[allows], where Title VII's purpose would be served, remedial orders
like that banned under the National Labor Relations Act as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB .... 58
Moreover, Representative Ford emphasized that "[t]he mandatory na-
ture of the remedial power in section 7118 on unfair labor practices is
intentional and is in marked contrast to the general discretionary au-
thority given the FLRA under section 7105(g)(3). ' 59
These passages, taken in conjunction with the requirement of sec-
tion 7118(a)(7) that the Authority issue a remedy appropriate to the
violation,60 suggest that a status quo ante order should be the rule
rather than the exception when an agency commits a section 7116(a)(5)
violation, including a failure to bargain over impact and implementa-
tion. It is apparent that Congress was aware that a bargaining order,
without a return to the status quo ante, merely reimposes the same obli-
gation that has just been violated, leaving the agency with the advan-
tage of having already implemented its decision unilaterally.
55. 124 CONG. REC. 38,715 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 4, at 993.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1978).
57. 124 CONG. REc. 38,713 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 990.
58. Id. at 38,713-14 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 992-93 (citations omitted). See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (held
that the NLRB lacked power to impose a substantive term on the parties or to compel
agreement).
59. 124 CONG. Rnc. 38,714 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 992.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(7) (1982) provides for the authority to take "such. . . action as
will carry out the purpose of this Chapter."
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Bargaining under such circumstances will take place, but the agency
has gained by its unfair labor practice insofar as union proposals are
given short shrift because the procedures already in place would be
costly to change. If such unilateral action is not rescinded, agencies
will have an incentive to "implement now and bargain later." Con-
gress intended to hold the federal government to a higher standard,
calling on the Authority to vigorously enforce the Statute "by adopting
remedies sufficiently strong and suitable to make real the promise of
the title and the obligations of its provisions. '61
Authority Decisions Concerning the Duty to Bargain and the
Appropriateness of Status Quo Ante Remedies
The Early Authority Cases
In its early cases, the Authority explicitly rejected the Council's
reasoning regarding bargaining62 and liberally granted status quo ante
orders.
In American Federation of Government Employees Local 1999 and
Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Dix-McGuire Exchange,63 the Au-
thority was presented with precisely the same issue faced by the Coun-
cil in Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms64: the negotiability of a
union proposal to stay disciplinary suspensions of employees pending
completion of the grievance process. Whereas the Council ruled the
proposal non-negotiable because it would unreasonably delay the exer-
cise of management's rights, the Authority in Dix-McGuire Exchange
reached the opposite conclusion, holding the proposal to be negotiable
under section 7106(b)(2) of the Statute.65 The Authority relied on the
Statute's legislative history,66 concluding:
Congress did not intend subsection (b)(2) to preclude negotiation on
a proposal merely because it may impose on management a require-
ment which would delay implementation of a particular action in-
volving the exercise of a specified management right. Rather, as the
Conference Report indicates, subsection (b)(2) is intended to author-
61. 124 CONG. REc. 38,714 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 4, at 992. Representative Ford went on to call attention to the irony inher-
ent in employer violations "where the employer is always an official violating the policy of
his employer-the Govermment-against unfair labor practices. " Id. at 38,715, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 4, at 993.
62. See National Treasury Employees Union and United States Customs Serv., Region
VIII, 2 FLRA No. 30, 2 FLRA 254 (Dec. 13, 1979); American Fed'n Gov't Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 1999 and Army-Air Force Exch. Serv., Dix-McGuire Exch., 2 FLRA No.
16, 2 FLRA 152 (Nov. 29, 1979), affd, 659 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63. 2 FLRA No. 16, 2 FLRA 152 (Nov. 29, 1979).
64. See supra note 33 & accompanying text.
65. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1999 and Army-Air Force
Exch. Serv., Dix-McGuire Exch., 2 FLRA at 154.
66. Id. at 154-58.
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ize an exclusive representative to negotiate fully on procedures, ex-
cept to the extent that such negotiations would prevent agency
management from acting at all That is, insofar as it is consistent with
the right of management ultimately to act, Congress intended the par-
ties to work out their differences with regard to procedures in
negotiations.67
In Defense Logistics Agency and American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees,68 the agency refused to honor its employees' valid au-
thorizations to have union dues automatically withheld from their pay
checks and forwarded to the union.69 The administrative law judge7°
believed that a reimbursement order, requiring the agency to reimburse
the union in an amount equal to the dues the union would have re-
ceived, would be a reasonable way of restoring the status quo ante.71
The judge concluded, however, that he lacked the power to grant such
a remedy.72 Yet the Authority included the remedy in its final order,
agreeing with the administrative law judge that "such remedy would be
compensatory rather than punitive. Moreover, such remedy would be
an effective deterrent to similar violations by agencies in the future. '73
67. id. at 155-56 (emphasis added). The reasoning in this case was followed in Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union and United States Customs Serv., Region VIII, 2 FLRA
No. 30, 2 FLRA 254 (Dec. 13, 1979).
68. 5 FLRA No. 21, 5 FLRA 126 (Feb. 12, 1981).
69. Id at 128-29. Such withholdings are allowed by § 7115. The agency's failure to
comply with this provision was found to violate § 7116(a)(1)(5) and (8). Id. at 128-29.
70. Under the Statute, the role of the administrative law judge is "to determine whether
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice." 5 U.S.C. § 7105(e)(2)
(1982). Any person may fie a charge alleging that an agency or a union has committed an
unfair labor practice. The General Counsel initially determines whether the charge has
merit, and, if so, issues a complaint. A hearing is then held before an administrative law
judge, who issues a recommended decision and order. That decision becomes the final deci-
sion of the Authority unless review is granted, in which case the Authority issues its own
opinion.
71. Defense Logistics Agency and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, 5 FLRA at 131-
32.
72. The judge believed that he was "bound by the decisions of the Assistant Secretary
until such time as those decisions are overruled by the Authority or found to be distinguish-
able, for some persuasive reason." .d. at 163. Section 7135(b) provides that decisions issued
under the Executive Order "shall remain in full force and effect. . . unless superseded by
...decisions issued pursuant to this chapter." 5 U.S.C. § 7135(b) (1982). Here the Author-
ity chose to factually distinguish the early cases cited by the administrative law judge. In
both United States Dep't of Defense, Dep't of the Navy, Naval Air Reserve Training Unit
and Local 1347, AFGE, A/SLMR No. 106, 1 A/SLMR 490 (Nov. 3, 1971), and The Adju-
tant General-Georgia, Georgia Nat'l Guard, Dep't of Defense and Georgia Ass'n of Civil-
ian Technicians, ACT, Inc., 2 FLRA No. 92, 2 FLRA 711 (Feb. 29, 1980), changed
circumstances in the bargaining unit justified cancellation of employees' valid dues deduc-
tion authorizations. As the Authority found no such changed circumstances in Defense Lo-
gistics Agency, the reimbursement order was an appropriate remedy. 5 FLRA at 133.
Accord United States Army Materiel Dev. and Readiness Command, and Local 1658,
American Fed'n Gov't Employees, 7 FLRA No. 30, 7 FLRA 194 (Nov. 12, 1981).
73. Defense Logistics Agency and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, 5 FLRA at 163.
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In San Antonio Air Logistics Center (AFLC) andAmerican Federa-
tion of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1617,7 4 the union al-
leged that the agency unilaterally changed its performance appraisal
system by implementing a 1979 Appraisal/Evaluation Guide without
affording the union an opportunity to bargain concerning its impact
and implementation.75 A second complaint alleged that the agency
unilaterally cancelled and established job positions without bargaining
on the impact and implementation of its decisions.76
After finding that unfair labor practices had been committed, the
administrative law judge recommended a status quo ante remedy. He
ordered the agency "to rescind and withdraw all evaluations of em-
ployees which were made under the 1979 Appraisal/Evaluation Guide
and to rescind and revoke the cancellation and the reestablishment of
the jobs in question. ' 77 The agency's exceptions to this recommended
order contended that the order "would create hardship on the part of
the Activity78 and constitute a potential disruption of the [Activity's]
operation. '79
The Authority affirmed the proposed order, finding the status quo
ante remedy appropriate because it "would not create a serious disrup-
tion of the Activity's operation." 80 The source of this "serious disrup-
tion" standard is unclear, and the standard is inconsistent with the
legislative history and earlier Authority decisions holding that agency
management must negotiate impact and implementation unless to do
so would prevent it from "acting at all." 8' Nevertheless, the rule formu-
lated here was that a status quo ante remedy is appropriate for viola-
tions of section 7116(a)(5) unless it would cause a serious disruption of
operations. While some disruption of operations may be the result of
the remedy's effectiveness as a deterrent, the serious disruption stan-
dard is nevertheless a reasonable safety valve for those situations in
which little would be gained, at great cost, by a return to the status quo
ante.82
74. 5 FLRA No. 22, 5 FLRA 173 (Feb. 17, 1981).
75. Id. at 179.
76. Id. The administrative law judge found the allegations to be true. He held, and the
Authority agreed, that the agency had violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. Id. at
173.
77. Id. at 174.
78. In the federal bureaucracy, an "activity" is a subdivision of an "agency."
79. Id. at 174.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 67 & accompanying text. Perhaps the standard is derived from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964),
in which the Court indicated that a status quo ante remedy might not be appropriate if it
"impose[d] an undue or unfair burden on the Company." Id. at 216.
82. See IRS and National Treasury Employees Union and NTEV Chapter 95, 9 FLRA
No. 73, 9 FLRA 648 (July 21, 1982), enforcement denied, 717 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1983),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 156-60.
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A few months later, in Norfolk Naval Shiyard and Tidewater Vir-
ginia Federal Employees Metal Trades Council,3 the Authority granted
another status quo ante remedy for a failure to bargain on impact and
implementation. The case concerned new duties imposed upon crane
operators. The administrative law judge found that "by unilaterally
requiring mobile crane operators to lubricate mobile cranes and main-
tain lubrication log books in mobile cranes," the agency had violated
section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. 84 Management had the right
under section 7106(a)(2)(B) "to assign work," but the exercise of that
right was contingent upon the full negotiation of impact and
implementation.8 5
In determining the appropriate remedy, the Authority found merit
in the General Counsel's exception to the failure of the administrative
law judge to include a status quo ante remedy in his recommended or-
der.86 The Authority was influenced by the fact that safety factors were
involved,87 and it noted that "there is nothing in the record to indicate
that a status quo ante remedy would create a serious disruption of the
[Agency's] operations. ' 88 The Authority's final order rescinded the oral
and departmental instructions that imposed the additional duties.8 9
These cases strongly implied that a status quo ante remedy should
be awarded when agency management unilaterally implements a deci-
sion without fulfilling its duty to bargain. The Authority appeared to
recognize that unless the unilateral action is rescinded, meaningful bar-
gaining cannot be expected to occur since the union would be bargain-
ing over implementation after the fact. Qualified by the reasonable
exception for "serious disruption" of operations, the status quo ante
remedy appeared to be presumptively appropriate under the early Au-
thority cases to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute.
Federal Correctional Institution and its Progeny
The Authority repudiated the logic of its early cases in its
landmark decision, Federal Correctional Institution and American Fed-
eration of Government Employees Local 2052.90 The administrative law
judge concluded, and the Authority agreed, that the respondent had
made unilateral changes in working conditions without bargaining on
83. 6 FLRA No. 22, 6 FLRA 74 (June 17, 1981).
84. Id. at 93.
85. Id. at 92.
86. Id. at 76.
87. "The Authority is of the opinion that a return to the status quo ante is appropriate
in the circumstances of this case, wherein the Respondent refused to negotiate procedures
and appropriate arrangements concerning, inter alia, safety factors." Id. at 77.
88. Id. (citing San Antonio Air Logistics Center (AFLC) and American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1617, 5 FLRA No. 22, 5 FLRA 173 (Feb. 17, 1981)).
89. Id. at 78.
90. 8 FLRA No. 111, 8 FLRA 604 (May 13, 1982).
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impact and implementation, and had thus violated section 7116(a)(1)
and (5).91 The changes involved
the relocation of a correctional officer from a guard tower to a mobile
patrolman position; the assignment of one correctional officer at the
dormitories to work at two dormitories in lieu of assigning one cor-
rectional officer to each separate dormitory; and the addition of a
position to the Receiving and Discharge Unit.92
The administrative law judge believed that a status quo ante rem-
edy was not appropriate because "[d]ecisional law enunciated by the
Authority holds that such a remedial order is not appropriate where an
employer is not obligated to bargain as to the decision to take particu-
lar action involving its employees." 93 Not yet having the benefit of the
decisions in San Antonio Air Logistics Center94 and Norfolk Naval Shio-
yard,95 the judge relied on section 7135 of the Statute96 and on The
Adjutant General's Office, Puerto Rico Air National Guard,97 a case aris-
ing under the Executive Order.
The Authority disagreed, holding that "status quo ante remedies
may be issued in certain refusal to bargain cases even where the
agency's decision itself was not negotiable. 98 However, the Authority
then stated that "the appropriateness of a status quo ante remedy must
be determined on a case-by-case basis, carefully balancing the nature
and circumstances of the particular violation against the degree of dis-
ruption in government operations that would be caused by such a rem-
edy."99 Thus, the earlier Authority rule that only a serious disruption
of operations would preclude a status quo ante remedy had evolved
into a formal balancing test.
The Authority named five factors that it would consider "in deter-
mining whether a status quo ante remedy would be appropriate in any
specific case involving a violation of the duty to bargain over impact
91. Id. at 605.
92. Id. at 604-05.
93. Id. at 620 n.1l.
94. See supra notes 74-82 & accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 83-89 & accompanying text.
96. The judge stated:
Under Section 7135 of the [Statute] all policies, regulations and procedures estab-
lished under Executive Order 11,491, as amended, continue in force and effect un-
less revoked by the President or the [Statute]. Thus, although this case arose under
the Order, the principle set forth in the cited case controls since there had been no
revocation thereof.
Federal Correctional Inst. and American Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 2052, 8 FLRA at
620 n. 11.
97. 3 FLRA No. 55, 3 FLRA 342 (June 3, 1980).
98. Federal Correctional Inst. and American Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 2052, 8
FLRA at 605.
99. Id. at 606.
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and implementation"c°: 1) whether the union received timely and ad-
equate notice of the proposed change; 2) whether the union made a
timely request to bargain on procedures and arrangements; 3) the will-
fulness of the agency's failure to bargain; 4) the impact experienced by
adversely affected employees; and 5) whether, and to what degree, a
status quo ante remedy would disrupt or impair the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the agency's operations.' 0l Specifically applying only the
fourth factor to the facts of Federal Correctional Institution, the Author-
ity concluded that no status quo ante remedy was required or necessary
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute, 0 2 because the
impact experienced by adversely affected employees was minimal.'0 3
This result is inconsistent with the Authority's prior decisions, and
even with its own test. First, the unilateral changes in Federal Correc-
tional Institution raised safety concerns as weighty as those deemed
controlling in Norfolk Naval Shpyard1 4 Rescinding the unilateral
changes would have ensured that those concerns were resolved through
the negotiation process, as Congress intended. 105
Second, the Authority made no finding that a status quo ante rem-
edy would disrupt or impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the
agency's operations. Absent serious disruption, such a remedy would
be appropriate under the reasoning of Norfolk Naval Shipyard and San
Antonio Air Logistics Center.
Finally, the Authority's sole application of the fourth factor of its
five factor test presents another inconsistency. The Authority decided
that because "only a few of the approximately 110 correctional officers
at the facility were directly affected by the changes. . . the impact on
employees within the bargaining unit is minimal."' 0 6 Surely the im-
pact experienced by the individual employees who were adversely af-
fected was not minimal. Instead of looking to "the nature and extent of
the impact experienced by adversely affected employees," 10 7 the Au-
thority considered the impact on the bargaining unit as a whole,
thereby misconstruing the purpose of adverse effects negotiations.108 In
any event, a rule that status quo ante remedies are inappropriate if the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 87. In fact, assigning one guard to two prison dormitories, see supra
text accompanying note 92, was probably more dangerous than the imposition of additional
duties on crane operators in Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
105. See supra text accompanying note 67.
106. Federal Correctional Inst. and American Fed'n Gov't Employees Local 2052, 8
FLRA at 606.
107. id.
108. It is not the impact on the bargaining unit but the impact on adversely affected
employees that is at issue. See supra notes 44-45 & accompanying text.
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adverse effects sought to be negotiated are "de minimus" is contrary to
congressional intent.10 9
The new test could lead to the result that status quo ante remedies
are never awarded in impact and implementation cases. The Authority
in Federal Correctional Institution correctly noted Congress' intent that
the Statute "be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement
of an effective and efficient Government."" 0 Yet while section 7101(b)
supports a "serious disruption of operations" exception to the general
rule that status quo ante remedies are appropriate in refusal to bargain
cases, it does not contemplate a wide-open balancing test. The Author-
ity's new test is easily abused in that balancing will often allow man-
agement to violate the Statute with impunity, a result reminiscent of
the Council's rigid "unreasonable delay" standard under the Executive
Order."'
It is noteworthy that the right of agency managers "to maintain the
efficiency of the Government operations entrusted to them" under sec-
tion 12(b)(4) of the Executive Order was not carried forward into the
management rights provisions of the Statute. Given Congress' concern
about abuse of the management rights provisions under the Executive
Order, 12 it is unlikely that Congress intended more stringent criteria
for awarding status quo ante remedies.
Ultimately, however, the reasonableness of the Authority's formu-
lation will depend on how it applies the new test under the case-by-case
approach.' 3 It is therefore instructive that in at least five cases 114 in-
109. Representative's Ford's remarks are again instructive:
Because of the increased stature for "adverse effect" negotiations, and for other
reasons, neither the conference report nor the statement of managers includes a de
minimus proviso allowing an agency to escape from its bargaining obligation. It is
fully the expectation that where the adverse effects are "de minimus" negotiations
will occur but that both parties will see that they proceed with appropriate
dispatch.
124 CoNG. Rc. 38,715 (statement of Rep. Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra
note 4, at 994. A prospective bargaining order seems insufficient to insure "the full negotia-
tion of arrangements regarding adverse effects and procedures." See supra text accompany-
ing note 55.
110. Federal Correctional Inst. and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, 8 FLRA at 606
n.3 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b)).
111. See supra notes 33-38 & accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying note 55.
113. See supra text accompanying note 99.
114. United States Dep't of Defense, Dep't of the Army, Headquarters, Fort Sam Hous-
ton and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2154, 8 FLRA No. 112, 8
FLRA 623 (May 13, 1982); United States Customs Serv., Region V and National Treasury
Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 168, 9 FLRA No. 15, 9 FLRA 116 (June 16, 1982);
Headquarters, 77th U.S. Army Command and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-
CIO, Local 2739, 9 FLRA No. 95, 9 FLRA 762 (Aug. 4, 1982); IRS and National Treasury
Employees Union, 10 FLRA No. 37, 10 FLRA 182 (Sept. 30, 1982); United States Dep't of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-
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volving a refusal to bargain on impact and implementation decided
since Federal Correctional Institution, the Authority has declined to or-
der a return to the status quo ante.
The Demise of the Status Quo Ante Remedy
In United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army,
Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston and American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2154, 5 a case decided the same day
as Federal Correctional Institution, the agency committed an unfair la-
bor practice by taking away certain duties from three payroll clerks and
establishing a new position without notifying the union and affording it
an opportunity to bargain over impact and implementation.1 16 In re-
jecting the General Counsel's request for a status quo ante remedy, the
Authority noted that "the changes in job duties implemented by the
Respondent have not resulted in and are not intended by the Respon-
dent to create a loss of grade or pay for any affected employee. Thus,
the impact on employees within the bargaining unit is minimal. 11 7
This decision may represent a further narrowing of the circum-
stances that justify a status quo ante remedy. It would now seem that in
order for a status quo ante remedy to be deemed appropriate in an im-
pact and implementation case, not only must a significant portion of
the bargaining unit be affected by management's unilateral action,"18
but the employees' pocketbooks must also be affected.
As in Federal Correctional Institution, the conclusion in Headquar-
ters, Fort Sam Houston that a status quo ante remedy was not required
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Statute did not hinge on a
specific finding that such a remedy would cause any disruption in gov-
ernment operations. 19 Rather than providing the basis for an excep-
tion to the general rule, as in San Antonio Air Logistics Center and
Norfolk Naval Shipyard,120 disruption of operations now seems to be
merely one of a number of factors that can cause the denial of a status
quo ante remedy.
In United States Customs Service, Region V and National Treasury
CIO, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. Council, II FLRA No. 27, 11 FLRA 90 (Jan.
20, 1983).
115. 8 FLRA No. 112, 8 FLRA 623 (May 13, 1982).
116. Id. at 625.
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying note 106.
119. United States Dep't of Defense, Dep't of Army, Headquarters, Fort Sam Houston
and American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2154, 8 FLRA at 625. Apparently,
after deciding that the impact on employees was minimal, the Authority felt no need to
consider whether a status quo ante remedy would disrupt the agency's operations.
120. See San Antonio Air Logistics Center (AFLC) and American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, AFL-CIO, Local 1617, 5 FLRA at 174; Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Tidewater Va.
Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council, 6 FLRA at 77.
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Employees Union and NTEU Chapter 168,121 a case involving a failure
to bargain on a decisional matter as well as a failure to bargain on
impact and implementation, the Authority fashioned a remedy in keep-
ing with the spirit of Federal Correctional Institution. Management had
unilaterally established a second shift and, at the same time, changed
the starting and quitting times of the existing shift for most pilots and
air officers.' 22 The Authority found that the decision to establish a sec-
ond shift was non-negotiable under section 7106(b)(1).123 On the other
hand, the Authority found that the agency had violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) by failing to afford the union an opportunity to ne-
gotiate impact and implementation. 24 The decision to change the
hours of the existing shift was held to be outside the scope of section
7106(b)(1), and hence a mandatory subject of bargaining. 25 The
agency also committed an unfair labor practice by failing to negotiate
the substance of its decision. 26
To the extent the decision itself was a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, the Authority ordered a return to the status quo ante, finding
"that an order directing reinstatement of the previously existing start-
ing and quitting times of the first shift, upon request of NTEU, and
requiring the parties to negotiate the starting and quitting times
thereof, is necessary to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Stat-
ute." ' 27 The remedy was necessary "in order to avoid rendering mean-
ingless the mutual obligation under the Statute to negotiate concerning
changes in conditions of employment."1 28
In contrast, to the extent the duty to bargain was limited to impact
and implementation, the Authority summarily found a status quo ante
remedy to be unwarranted. 29 Employing reasoning reminiscent of the
121. 9 FLRA No. 15, 9 FLRA 116 (June 16, 1982).
122. Id. at 117.
123. Id. at 118.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 119.
128. Id.
129. According to the Authority,
balancing the nature and circumstances of the violation against the degree of dis-
ruption in government operations that would be caused by such a remedy, and
taking into consideration the various factors set forth in Federal Correctional Insti-
tution, the Authority concludes that an order requiring the Respondent to bargain
upon request about impact and implementation will best effectuate the purposes
and policies of the Statute.
Id. (citation omitted). To understand the Authority's rationale, see United States Customs
Serv., Region VIII and NTEU, 9 FLRA No. 68, 9 FLRA 606 (July 21, 1982), a later case
involving identical issues. The Authority reasoned that management enjoyed an unques-
tioned right to unilaterally establish additional shifts, and that since there were no pre-ex-
isting starting and quitting times or lunch periods to reinstate, no status quo ante remedy was
warranted. Id. at 607.
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Council cases, the Authority noted that the agency had acted within its
reserved rights under section 7106(b)(1).130 Even so, it would seem that
a status quo ante remedy was necessary "to avoid rendering meaning-
less the mutual obligation under the Statute to negotiate concerning"
impact and implementation. 31
The Authority has established other restrictions on the use of the
status quo ante remedy. In past refusal-to-bargain cases, the burden of
persuasion was on the agency to show why a status quo ante should not
be granted.' 32 Today the burden seems to be on the aggrieved party to
show why such a remedy should be required. In Headquarters, 77th
U.S. Army Command andAmerican Federation of Government Employ-
ees, AFL-CIO Local 2739,133 the Authority denied the General Coun-
sel's request for a status quo ante remedy because the request was
"unsupported by any reasons why such a remedy should be granted in
the circumstances presented herein."t 34 Section 7(c) of the Aministra-
tive Procedure Act 35 provides that the proponent of an order should
have the burden of proof. However, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted this to mean only the burden of going forward, not the burden
of persuasion.' 36 Once it has been established that a section 7116(a)(5)
violation has occurred, the burden of persuasion should be on the em-
ployer to show why a status quo ante remedy is unwarranted. In other
words, if a status quo ante order is presumptively appropriate under the
reasoning of San Antonio Air Logistics Center and Norfolk Naval Ship-
yard, then the burden should shift to the employer to show that the
"serious disruption" exception applies.
The Authority further limited the range of cases in which a status
quo ante remedy will be deemed appropriate by announcing an appar-
ent "good faith" exception in Internal Revenue Service and National
Treasury Employees Union. 37 The case involved the nationwide im-
plementation of a new Collection Quality Review System (CQRS).' 38
A large number of IRS employees experienced the impact of the re-
structuring, which was so major that the agency previewed the new sys-
130. United States Customs Serv., Region V and National Treasury Employees Union
and NTEU Chapter 168, 9 FLRA at 119-20.
131. See supra text accompanying note 128.
132. In San Antonio Air Logistics Center, the agency argued that a status quo ante rem-
edy should not be required because "such order would create hardship on the part of the
Activity and constitute a potential disruption of the Respondent's operation." 5 FLRA No.
22, 5 FLRA 173, 174 (Feb. 17, 1981). The Authority found that this contention was not
sustained by the evidence. Id. In other words, the remedy was appropriate because the
Agency did not meet its burden of persuasion.
133. 9 FLRA No. 95, 9 FLRA 762 (Aug. 4, 1982).
134. Id. at 764.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1982).
136. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2475 n.7 (1983).
137. 10 FLRA No. 37, 10 FLRA 182 (Sept. 30, 1982).
138. Id. at 182.
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tern by implementing a pilot program. 39 The pilot program was the
subject of good faith negotiations between IRS and NTEU that re-
sulted in a memorandum of understanding. 40 At the time of the na-
tionwide implementation, the agency took the position that NTEU was
limited to bargaining on revisions made by IRS in the pilot program or
matters that had been explicitly reserved for future negotations.' 4 1 It
then rejected NTEU's proposals as not within these categories. 42
The Authority found that the original memorandum of under-
standing contained no clear and unmistakable waiver of NTEU's
right to propose changes in procedures and appropriate arrange-
ments for employees who would be adversely affected by the new
system based upon its own experience in dealing with the CQRS dur-
ing the pilot program, and that it would be inconsistent with the pur-
poses and policies of the Statute to limit the Respondent's bargaining
obligation strictly to the proposed changes in the CQRS initiated by
management. 43
Thus, the agency had violated section 71 16(a)(1) and (5).1 4Yet, calling
the agency's position "an arguable but mistaken belief that its obliga-
tion. . . was so limited,"1 45 the Authority determined that "balancing
the nature and circumstances of the violation against the degree of dis-
ruption in government operations that would be caused by such a rem-
edy, and taking into consideration the various factors set forth in
Federal Correctional Institution," no status quo ante remedy was
warranted.146
Such an exception for good faith should have no place in the fed-
eral sector scheme, where the scope of bargaining is already narrowly
circumscribed. Indeed, in NLRB v. Katz,14 7 the Supreme Court held
that good faith is no excuse even under the NLRA.148 The Statute pro-
tects management rights, yet limits the exercise of those rights by re-
quiring the "full negotiation of arrangements regarding adverse effects
and procedures."' 49 Admittedly, the degree of disruption that would
have been caused by a status quo ante remedy after the nationwide pro-
gram had already been implemented was substantial. Yet, the degree
of impact experienced by adversely affected employees was no less sub-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 183.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 184.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Authority also noted that a status quo ante remedy would cause a substan-
tial disruption of government operations. Both this factor and the agency's good faith per-
suaded the Authority to deny such a remedy.
147. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
148. Id. at 743.
149. See supra note 55 & accompanying text.
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stantial. The purposes and policies of the Statute would have been bet-
ter served by a remedy that would have given agencies a clear message
to negotiate when in doubt about their obligation.150
The potential for abuse of the Federal Correctional Institution stan-
dard is illustrated by the decision and dissent in United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Southern
Region and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, Southern Region. I51
The case involved a unilateral change in the processing of dangerous
aliens.1 52 Applying the test of Federal Correctional Institution, the ma-
jority held that a prospective bargaining order would be an adequate
remedy "in light of the likelihood that a return to the status quo ante
would disrupt or impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the Respon-
dent's operations."' 153 Chairman Ronald W. Haughton filed a separate
dissenting opinion, 154 concluding that
weighing the substantial impact of the unilateral change on unit em-
ployees against the relatively minimal degree of disruption in the
Center's operations that would be caused by requiring a return to the
pre-existing practice regarding the detention or transfer of dangerous
aliens, pending negotiations with the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative . . a status quo ante remedy is appropriate in order to effectu-
ate the purposes and policies of the Statute. 155
This case demonstrates that the tests of Federal Correctional Institution
and its progeny can be applied to reach whatever result is desired. Re-
cently, the Authority has generally desired to avoid inconveniencing
agency management.
Carried one step further, extending the new standards into the
area of decisional bargaining could preclude status quo ante remedies
except for the most flagrant violations of the duty to bargain. For ex-
ample, in Internal Revenue Service and National Treasury Employees
Union and NTEU Chapter 95,156 the agency had made unilateral
changes in its office space design. Although the Authority held that
management had not acted within its reserved rights under section
7106(b)(1) and ordered the agency to bargain on the union's propos-
als, 157 it noted that "no apparent purpose would be served by requiring
150. "It is the intention of the conference committee that agencies and employee repre-
sentatives should spend their efforts resolving mutual problems and improving performance
instead of litigating over barriers to negotiation." 124 CONG. REc. 38,713 (statement of Rep.
Ford), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 990.
151. 11 FLRA No. 27, 11 FLRA 90 (Jan. 20, 1983).
152. Id. at 90.
153. Id. at 92.
154. Id. at 94.
155. Id. (citing Norfolk Naval Shoyard and San Antonio Air Logistics Center).
156. 9 FLRA No. 73, 9 FLRA 648 (July 21, 1982), enforcement denied, 717 F.2d 1174
(7th Cir. 1983).
157. Id. at 651.
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the Respondent to dismantle the reorganized office structure, thereby
causing substantial disruption in the Chicago Regional Office's opera-
tions, before the parties have had an opportunity to agree upon an ar-
rangement."'' 58 To reach this result, the Authority applied the Federal
CorrectionalInstitution balancing test, developed for impact and imple-
mentation cases, to a situation in which management's decision itself
was determined by the Authority to be a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing.159 That determination was reversed on appeal, causing the Au-
thority's bargaining order to be denied enforcement. 160 Nevertheless,
the case is instructive regarding the Authority's current predilections.
Federal Service Bargaining and the Future of the Status Quo Ante Remedy
The Authority's reluctance to grant meaningful relief in the form
of a status quo ante remedy in impact and implementation cases is
symptomatic of its excessive deference to management rights. The Au-
thority's failure to place the Statute's management rights provisions in
proper perspective was recently taken to task by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals in American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. Federal Labor Relations Author-
ity. 6' A union proposal concerning repromotion rights for employees
demoted through no fault of their own was deemed non-negotiable by
the Authority because it would
directly interfere with the exercise of management's rights under sec-
tion 7106(a)(2)(c) to choose among candidates from appropriate
sources in filling a vacancy and, consequently, cannot be deemed an
'appropriate arrangement for employees adversely affected' by man-
agement's exercise of its statutory rights, within the meaning of sec-
tion 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.' 62
The Court found it impossible to sustain this reading of the Statute, 63
concluding that paragraph (b)(3) was intended as "an exception to the
otherwise governing managment prerogative requirements of subsec-
tion (a)."' 64 Thus, negotiation of arrangements for adversely affected
employees would be inappropriate only if they impinged upon man-
agement rights "to an excessive degree."'1 65
In the wake of Federal Correctional Institution, many federal sector
unions must have wondered if they would ever again see a status quo
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. IRS v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 717 F.2d at 1177.
161. 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
162. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 and Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7 FLRA No. 13, 7 FLRA 91, 93 (Oct. 30, 1981).
163. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. Federal Labor Rela-
tions Auth., 702 F.2d at 1185.
164. Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 1188 (emphasis in original).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
ante remedy. The remedy is probably still available in most cases
when the matter about which the agency failed to bargain does not
involve the exercise of a reserved management right. 16 6 Also, in impact
and implementation cases, when the impact experienced by bargaining
unit employees involves a loss of grade or pay, a status quo ante remedy
is still available. A good example is Internal Revenue Service and Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union. 167 In that case, the agency failed to
give adequate notice to the union in order to afford it the opportunity
to bargain about the impact and implementation of its decision to ter-
minate the Accounting Training Program (ATP) for certain bargaining
unit employees. 168 Even though the decision itself was non-negotiable
under section 7106(a)(2)(B), the Authority found a status quo ante rem-
edy to be warranted because the employees lost a training opportunity
intended to qualify them for the Revenue Agent series 169 and were
thus significantly affected. Because the ATP was retained for other em-
ployees, there was no significant disruption of operations due to the
award of a status quo ante remedy. 70
It should be noted, however, that one member of the Authority' 17
concurred in the finding that an unfair labor practice had been commit-
ted but dissented from the granting of a status quo ante remedy. In his
view, the ATP was merely a "fringe benefit," the termination of which
was a less serious problem than the disruption in operations resulting
from the status quo ante remedy. 172 Hopefully, the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision will remind the Authority of the mandatory nature of
the obligation to bargain about impact and implementation, an obliga-
tion that requires a sufficiently strong remedy when it is violated.
Conclusion
The Statute expanded the scope of collective bargaining that ex-
isted under the Executive Order and held out the promise of more
meaningful negotiations with "remedies sufficiently strong and suitable
to make real the promise of the title and the obligations of its provi-
sions."'173 The increased stature of impact and implementation negoti-
ations was key to the passage of the bill, and Congress realized that for
those negotiations to be meaningful, the Authority must grant appro-
166. See supra note 26. But see supra notes 156-60 & accompanying text.
167. 10 FLRA No. 61, 10 FLRA 326 (Oct. 8, 1982).
168. Id. at 326.
169. Id. at 328.
170. Id. at 328-29.
171. Member Leon B. Applewhaite filed a separate opinion. Id. at 331. Mr. Ap-
plewhaite's term recently expired. He was replaced by the new Chairwoman of the Author-
ity, Barbara J. Mahone.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 61 & accompanying text.
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priate relief when the obligation to bargain is violated.' 74
When agency management avoids its obligation to bargain by
claiming its traditional right to maintain efficiency, it is the Authority's
task to enforce the obligation to bargain about any condition of em-
ployment. The managment rights provisions of section 7106 constitute
a limited exception to the duty to bargain. The impact and implemen-
tation provisions are exceptions to the exception. The Authority has
often focused narrowly on management rights and ignored this larger
picture. When the Authority fails to grant meaningful relief, it rein-
forces the belief of many agency managers that greater efficiency comes
not from collective bargaining, as Congress intended, 175 but from uni-
lateral action.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the status quo ante remedy
achieves the policy goals of the Statute by advancing collective bar-
gaining without negating management's right "ultimately to act."' 176
The remedy is necessary to maintain the bargaining power of federal
sector unions and was intended by Congress for this very purpose. If
the Authority is to provide an effective deterrent to the commission of
unfair labor practices pursuant to section 7118,177 it should routinely
order a return to the status quo ante in section 7116(a)(5) cases.
Yet Federal Correctional Institution and its progeny place unrea-
sonable restrictions on the availability of status quo ante remedies. The
Authority has failed to provide the vigorous enforcement of the Statute
that Congress envisioned. The trend toward denial of status quo ante
remedies except in extreme cases should be reversed. The Statute's pur-
poses and policies would be better served by a return to the rule of San
Antonio Air Logistics Center and Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The remedy
should be presumptively appropriate for violations of section
7116(a)(5).
Joseph William Bell*
174. See supra 60-61 & accompanying text.
175. See supra note 109.
176. See supra text accompanying note 67.
177. See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
* Member, Third Year Class.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
